Introduction
The advent of the AIDS epidemic has refocused attention on Australian drug policy,a nd this interest mayi ncrease if we follow the trends evident in the U. S.A. Australian drug laws are expensive but ineffective.T he cost of the laws is borne by the taxpayer,b yh ouseholds,a nd by the hapless drug users themselves.J ust how muchdoes present policy cost the Australian taxpayer? To what extent does the ineffectiveness of the lawi np reventing illicit drug use indirectly add to costs borne by Australian households? These are the questions to be addressed here. 2 
Drug-Law-Enforcement Costs
Drug-law-enforcement (DLE)costs include the expenditures by government to enforce the drug laws.T he 1989 Report by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority (hereafter referred to as the Cleeland Report) calculated the drug-law-enforcement costs as shown in Table 1 . 3 The figure for Courts is based on the proportion-around 3.34%-of drug offences dealt with, and does not include the costs of legal representation and the costs of the time and delays for non-forensic participants. Marks (1991) argues that across the State police forces the proportion of officers who are employed directly and exclusively in drug law-enforcement is less than 2.5% of the total number of officers in all States,a nd closer to 1% in most. Compare this with the figure that of all prisoners in all Australian gaols in June 1988, 11% had been convicted of "drug offences" (Australia Year Book 1990) , whichi ndicates that while a small proportion of officers are engaged in enforcing the drug laws,as ignificant proportion must be engaged Source:C leeland Report (1989, Table 4) in coping with crimes committed by those circumventing these laws. Moreover,the Australian Federal Police (1988) state that they have about 650 staff "actively involved in the collection of intelligence on and investigation of drug-related offences," compared to the 350 officers reported to Cleeland, whichw ould pro-rate their DLE costs to $33.6 million. Focusing on the small percentages of exclusively drug-law-enforcing officers is to underestimate considerably the actual costs of the drug laws.S imilarly,t he number of drug offences underestimates the number of crimes whicha re drug-use related, suchasincome-generating crimes. On 30 June 1988 5,431 prisoners (44.1%) were held in Australian gaols for various kinds of theft, and only 1,351 (11.0%) were there for drug offences (Australia Year Book 1990) . If only 40% of the total theft offences/charges were associated with the high price of illicit drugs,t hen regulated, low-price regime for these drugs would have reduced the prison population by a further 2,172 prisoners in 1988, at a saving of $71.7 million in recurrent costs for that year.T his should be added to the cost of the drug laws,w hichw ould result in a 258% increase in the figure for Prisons in Table 1 . If we assume a round factor of 250%, then the annual recurrent cost of Prisons due to the drug laws becomes $113.3 million. If the same factor of 2.5 applied for the Courts and State Police costs,t hose figures would become $43.5 million and $64.3 million, respectively.
Using a figure of $200,000 per cell and assuming dual occupancy and a discount rate of 12% p.a., Marks (1991) calculates the annualized cost of housing 3,523 prisoners as $352.3 million, equivalent to an annualised total cost of $42.3 million, or $12,000 per prisoner.
Af urther cost to taxpayers ignored by the Cleeland Report is the cost of legal aid, whichi n1 987−88 was $70.6 million (Mukherjee Neuhaus and Walker 1990:56) . If we pro-rate this figure by the ratio (3.34%) of the number of drug offences reported to the number of all offences reported, we obtain a figure of $2.4 million. Using the factor of 2.5, we obtain drug-crime-related legal-aid costs of $5.9 million.
We present these revised figures in The figure of $320 million for 1987−88 represents the cost to the Australian taxpayer of the resources diverted from other law-enforcement work to attempt to enforce the drug laws.A lthough conservative,i ti so ver twice the Cleeland Report's$123.2 million. In order to derive the total costs associated with the criminal-justice system, it is necessary to have estimates of the full costs of legal representation and the costs associated with court delays.T he costs of court congestion mayb em et by the taxpayer when more courts are built and more judges appointed; otherwise these costs are borne by society at large through justice delayed.
The Costs of Crime
Because of the law-enforcement effort, the prices of the illegal drugs are muchh igher than the costs of supply.I nar ecent paper,M arks (1990b) compares the gross returns for heroin at the three stages in the distribution process of importing,w holesaling,a nd ounce dealing in 1974 New York, in 1981 Melbourne,a nd in 1988 Sydney.H is study reveals the extremely high incentives for unscrupulous entrepreneurs to undertake the risk of smuggling the illicit heroin into Australia.
The Cleeland Report provides survey estimates for three prohibited drugs,c annabis,h eroin, and cocaine,w hicha re reproduced in Table 3 . We shall use the prices cited in Dobinson and Poletti (1988) (1990b)-in particular the consumption and prices paid by the frequent and regular users contrasted with the occasional users-and the numbers of frequent and regular users of heroin in 1987 from various trends (Marks 1990a )t oe stimate the net revenues generated by the exchange of blackmarket heroin in Australia.
NumbersofHeroin Users
Despite disagreement on the actual numbers,t here is growing agreement on the ratio of the numbers of occasional or "social" heroin users to the numbers of frequent and regular users-addicts,inthe popular view-of between eight and ten to one,whichhas appeared in overseas studies (Marks 1990a) , and in an unusual survey made in 1981 Melbourne by the illicit industry itself (Marks 1990b) . As Marks (1990a,F igure 1) and CDCSH (1990, Table 5 .11) report, the opiate-related deaths per 100,000 have risen from 0.4 in 1977 to 2.0 in 1987. If,f ollowing Marks (1990a), we assume that in 1977 there were 8,000 regular and frequent users of illicit heroin, and if one assumes that these numbers are correlated with the death rates and other indicators,t hen the estimate of regular and frequent heroin users in 1987 would have been 40,000, with around 300,000 occasional or "week-end" users.T hese figures are in broad agreement with the National Advisory Council on AIDS study of Australian experience of injecting illicit drugs,w hichs uggested that 600,000 people had self-injected illicit drugs at least once in their lives,and that 240,000 had selfinjected illicit drugs at least once in the previous twelve months (NACAIDS 1988) , and with the National Drug Abuse Data System's" conservative" estimates of "30,000 to 50,000 frequent, regular dependent heroin users," although our numbers of occasional users are greater than their "at least 60,000 irregular,'recreational' non-dependent heroin users" (NDADS 1988).
Prices,Amounts,and Costs of Heroin Used
In 1988, the importers were paying between $12,000 and $15,000 per kg for 80%-pure heroin in Thailand, and selling it in Sydney for between $200,000 and $250,000 per kg (Dobinson and Poletti 1988) . As the drug moved down the distribution pyramid, its purity fell as it was successively diluted, while its effective price (for the 80%-pure equivalent) rose,a nd while some of the drug was consumed before it reached the street at the bottom of the distribution pyramid. The effective price on the street was equivalent to between $800,000 and $1,000,000 per 80%-pure kilogram.
Conservatively,w ea ssume 30,000 regular and frequent heroin users and 200,000 occasional heroin users.I fw ea ccept the 1981 Melbourne data on quantities consumed, the regular and frequent heroin users consume on average 98 gp er year per person of 80%-pure,a nd the occasional users consume on average 4.5 gper year per person of 80%-pure (Marks 1990b:76) . 4 Our figures correspond to a total of 2,940 kg per year for the regular and frequent users,and a total of 900 kg per year for the occasional users,agrand total of 3,840 kg per year,o re leven times more than the Cleeland Report estimated (Cleeland 1989:ix) .
Conservatively,weassume that the total amount of heroin successfully smuggled into Australia in 1987 was 2,500 kg of 80%-pure equivalent. From the figures presented above,t his would have cost between $30 million and $37.5 million in Thailand, with a theoretical value added of between $2 billion and $2.5 billion at Sydney street prices.F rom Marks (1990b:7 6) , roughly 70% by mass (or 60% by value) of any imported kilo is consumed by the regular and frequent users,paying wholesale prices,and the remainder is consumed by the occasional users,p aying street prices.T he consumption at the wholesale level reduces the theoretical value from $2 billion per year to $1.5 billion per year,which, less distribution and handling costs,isthe return to the people in the distribution pyramid. It underlines the lure of heroin trading for unscrupulous entrepreneurs.I ta lso represents the value of the income necessary to obtain heroin.
How to Pay for Drugs
The cost of recreational drug use-about $40 per week per user on average,or about $600 million in aggregate-mayw ell be met from legitimate sources of income.T hat leaves up to $900 million per year spent by the regular and frequent users,w ho are in general unable or unwilling to generate more than asmall fraction of this amount legally.
It is clear that illicit drug use and property crime are correlated (Wardlaw1 981, Dobinson and Ward 1985) , and that there is a broad relationship over time between the number of regular users-addicts-and the property-crime rate (Brown and Silverman 1974 , Silverman and Spruill 1977 , Parker and Newcombe 1987 . Brown and Silverman have also found that there is a short-run positive correlation between increases in the price of heroin and increases in property crime.W ea ssume that a regulated, lowprice regime would eliminate the number of drug offences and reduce by 40% the number of drug-related property crimes.
Apart from illicit drugs dealing,t he major sources of income for the regular and frequent heroin users include property crimes,p rostitution, and other illegal activities,s ucha ss hoplifting,f raud, and armed robbery. Dobinson and Poletti (1988) Table 4 shows that for these user/sellers most income occurs from sales of the drug,b ut that up to two-thirds of the rest is obtained from illegal activities: 34.7% from property crimes,u pt o3 0.3% from prostitution, and a further 1.8% from drug-related rip-offs.A ts ome level in the distribution pyramid below the level surveyed by Dobinson and Poletti there must be an end to onselling; the users buy for their own consumption alone.T he figure of $1.5 billion represents the sum of the income necessary for own-consumption purchases.F or this reason we focus on the pattern of Other income presented in Table 4 , and ignore the revenues from sales to other drug users. $900 million comes from non-drug-selling income.F rom Table 4 , this means $312 million from property crime,$ 190 million from social security payments,$ 174 million from family and friends (including some prostitution earnings), $99 million from prostitution, and the balance of $125 million from the remaining (legal) activities.T he Cleeland Report (1989:79) was told that as mucha s7 0% of all crime and 80% of property crime in some States is drug-related. In 1987−88 312,432 break-and-enter offences were reported to police in Australia (Mukherjee and Dagger 1990:19) . Based on an average figure reported by NSW Police of property worth $1,100 stolen in such burglaries in 1985−86, suchcrimes could generate up to $400 million (in 1988 dollars) alone.T he costs associated with suchc rime are shared across Australian society,through higher insurance premiums and tighter security.
In the absence of data on the importance of the various types of property crimes in generating income,w es hall use the percentages of the incidence of these crimes Ward 1985, 1987) as equivalent to their shares of income generation, whichm eans that break-and-enter plus larceny is 60.7%, shoplifting 11.8%, fraud 10.5%, receiving 5.3%, motor vehicle theft 5.3%, armed robbery 1.9%, and robbery 1.1% (Marks 1991, Table  9 ).
Following Casey and Preble (1974) , we calculate the value of stolen goods necessary to generate the above proportions of the total proceeds of drug-user property crime,o fa tl east $312 million. Break-and-enter and larceny is a source of revenue for 60.7% or $189 million. To determine the dollar transfers brought about by these crimes,i ti sn ecessary first to determine the proportion of the $189 million that constituted cash stolenthe balance was derived from the sale of fenceable goods.R oumasset and Hadreas (1977) reported a 50% discount in the second-hand market in which suchs tolen goods are sold. If only cash were taken, the transfer would be equal to $189 million; if,i nstead, only fenceable goods were taken, the amount would be $379 million (twice $189 million). There is no direct evidence on the basis of whicht op redict where in this range the actual transfer will fall. We take the mean of $284 million per year,w hichi s conservatively less than the $400 million mentioned above.T he figure of $284 million stolen to fetch$ 189 million implies a destruction of value of $95 million in the imperfect market for stolen goods.
Shoplifting,m otor vehicle theft, and receiving together generate 22.4% or $79 million. Since these crimes result in the theft of fenceable property, the total transfer that results is equal to $140 million, with a destruction of value equal to $79 million. Fraud, robbery,a nd armed robbery involve transfer of money.T hese three crimes together generate 13.5% or $42 million. Our conservative estimate of the total value of forced transfers as a consequence of drug-related property crime was thus $466 million in 1987. Furthermore,t he value of prostitution by drug users or their de factos may have been as mucha s$ 273 million in the prostitutes' hands (from total revenues of perhaps twice that).
Cannabis and Cocaine
As stated in Table 3 above,the Cleeland Report'sconservative estimate of the annual turnover of the heroin industry in Australia was $699 million in 1988. We havea rgued that a very conservative estimate of this turnover is $1.5 billion, whichi sa ssociated with forced transfers of property worth $466 million, and other direct and indirect costs: the market for stolen goods is imperfect-we have estimated a destruction of value of $174 million. If the Report'sfi gures for cannabis and cocaine are pro-rated, these annual turnovers are $4,090 million and $28 million, respectively.
Other Social Costs and Transfers

Crime
In addition to the tangible costs of crime associated with drug use,t here are intangible traumas and fears whichs tem from higher levels of crime in society.F urther,t he very high returns (Marks 1990b )a ttract unscrupulous entrepreneurs into the trade,p eople who are willing and able to corrupt and intimidate.I nt he case either of an effective prohibition or of a regulated, low-cost regime,all suchcosts would be muchreduced.
In response to the property losses resulting from drug-related property crimes,h ouseholds and firms will spend more on insurance and security.I f people spend as mucho rm ore on defensive measures (including insurance) as they expect to lose through property crime,t hen the social costs will be higher by another $466 million or so.AU. S. study (Casey and Preble, 1 974) estimated that suchd efensive measures were worth about 49.5% of the value of property stolen, whichwould be $230 million if the ratio held for Australia.
Health Care
Universal health insurance through Medicare results in Australian society bearing the cost of health care for those who could not otherwise afford it. One effect of the drug laws,e specially on those who inject the illicit drugs,i s to increase the risks that they will suffer bad health, and contract infectious diseases,s ucha s AIDS,t hrough sharing needles.M oreover,a st he Cleeland Report (1989:84) notes,t heir preoccupation with raising the required money and then using the drug when they can means that the regular and frequent heroin users will often paylittle attention to their general health, fitness,and adequate nutrition. To the extent that this neglect adds to the burden on the public hospital and health-care systems,i ti sp roperly counted as a further cost of the existing drug laws.
Unfortunately,t here is no consistent measure of hospital costs Australia-wide.A sac onsequence,t he National Drug Abuse Data System conservatively estimates that as few as one in ten of the total number of drug-caused separations are identified. There is increasing awareness of the importance of reducing the spread of HIV infection from intravenous drug users to the heterosexual population at large.T he needle-exchange schemes instituted in Sydney and Melbourne are an attempt to reduce this spread. The emotional costs from the AIDS epidemic will be high. So too will the social costs: Coe (1987) estimated that the cost of the unchecked epidemic to Australia would be $22 billion.
To the end of 1987−88, $56.7 million had been allocated by Australian governments on new and expanded treatment and rehabilitation centres for drug users (CDCSH 1988) . As of June 1988, there were 6,120 clients in methadone maintenance programmes,a tac ost per client per week of between $61 and $239 (Baldwin 1987) , depending on the degree of support, an annual bill of between $19.4 million and $76 million. We take the mean of $48 million.
Forgone Production due to Premature Deaths
The morbidity and mortality associated with the drug laws impose a cost on Australia through reduced production. Calculations in Marks (1991) show that the 709 deaths from illicit drug use in 1987 resulted in 20,490 working years forgone through premature death. At an average annual labour cost of $23,980 in 1987 −88 (Australia Year Book 1990 a nd assuming that this reflects the average productivity per worker and assuming no increase in real productivity,t hen the premature deaths in one year,1 987, from all illicit drugs resulted in a present value of forgone future production of $178 million using an 8%-per-annum discount rate.T his understates the value of lives and health, since it does not include the value people place on the lives and health of themselves and their families.
Social Security Payments
21.1% of the non-drug-dealing income of the group of user/sellers interviewed by Dobinson and Poletti (1988) came from government pensions.F or some frequent and heavy users,these funds maybeinthe form of invalid pensions, as well as unemployment benefits or other payments.I tm ay also be the case that some of the payments from family/friends also originate from social security payments.P ro-rating these direct payments across the required income implies a total annual cost of $190 million, close to $125 per week for eachof30,000 regular and frequent heroin users we have assumed.
Conclusion
Using data published in Marks 1990b,a nd the three studies by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Ward 1985, 1987; Dobinson and Poletti 1988) , we have argued that the Cleeland Report (1989) underestimates the true costs of the lawe nforcement against illicit drug use by a factor of at least two.O ur estimates of the social costs and drug-related transfers are presented in Table 5 . The conservative assumptions underlying these calculations are clearly discussed above.W eh aven ot included the costs of morbidity and mortality in terms of forgone production due to the drug-related spread of the AIDS epidemic.W eb elieve that a large proportion of these costs would be eliminated if the drugs were made available,a tc ost, to regulated drug users,r ather than the existing situation of black-market availability.T he cost of suchr egulation need not be high; in a study of methadone maintenance clinics in Sydney, Baldwin (1987) has costed a "barebones" clinic at $61 per patient per week. If only a relatively small number of addicts commence productive,t ax-generating work under the regulated regime,t he cost of administering it will be recouped in higher income-tax receipts,a nd the addicts and their families will experience great relief and a sense of accomplishment, which, however,w eh aven ot attempted to evaluate here.
Abstract
Despite seventy years of increasing restrictions,a nd in the case of heroin almost forty years of absolute prohibition, by all measures the consumption of illegal drugs in Australia has continued to grow.D espite-or perhaps because of-these policies,t he costs of enforcement borne by the taxpayer and other costs borne by residents at large have continued to grow as well. The AIDS epidemic exposes IV drug users and their partners to the risk of HIV infection, a further cost, but it has encouraged discussion of the effectiveness of the existing policy and the feasibility of alternatives.T his study is an attempt to put dollar amounts on these costs,and to estimate how they would change under an alternative policy of drug-use regulation. We argue that the recent Cleeland Report underestimates the true costs of the lawenforcement against illicit drug use by a factor of at least two. We estimate a total annual cost of existing drug laws in 1987−88 to Australia of $950 million, as well as forced transfers of $656 million. 
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